“If we want to build huts in Africa, we mustn’t bring the roofs in from Europe. For things will get complicated when the roof isn’t finished yet, the gables come from France and the roof is adorned with British decorations. And if, on top of this, the roof design also requires that the African foundations be altered, things will get even more complicated.”

With this quotation by an African participant, the moderator of the concluding panel discussion, Ute Schaeffer of Deutsche Welle, illustrated the problems of the Euro-African partnership, thus setting coherence and complementarity as the key topics in the discussion.

So what is new about the EU Strategy for Europe, and how should it be implemented to eliminate these shortcomings? Addressing Dr. Michael Hofmann, Head of Division at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, this was the first question that Schaeffer posed in the discussion.


 “That it is there in the first place is in fact quite a feat,” was the initial, modest response. Nevertheless, it ought to be appreciated and welcomed, for “with the EU’s Strategy for Africa, the EU’s policy on Africa is being developed in a more transparent, structured and comprehensive manner. The Strategy overcomes the present fragmentation of policies and approaches among the Commission and the Member States towards Africa. This is an important step towards more coherence in co-operation with Africa.” Hofmann maintained that the 25 states of the EU arriving at a common strategy and making a joint offer to Africa in one package was already an achievement in itself. However, the Europeans were aware that there were still loose ends to tie up and that the Strategy and Euro-African Partnership was understood as an offer and a process. “It would be desirable to adopt the Strategy as a common basis for a new form of dialogue at the planned EU/Africa Summit in Lisbon.” Africa was facing great opportunities because it had seen progress in institutional development. In this context, alongside the AU and NEPAD, Hofmann also stressed the role of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or SADC as well as that of the African Development Bank, whose positive development was going to extend options for trade.

Now it was crucial to clarify who was doing what in which region on the basis of the Strategy for Africa and in harmony with the instrumental requirements of the Paris Declaration on Donor Harmonisation in order to achieve a greater division of labour. “As an integral element of this process, the EU strategy aims at a new quality of intensive interaction via political dialogue and the monitoring of mutual commitments.”

A much-flogged term: the issue of coherence

According to Michael Hofmann, coherence in the EU’s policy on Africa bears countless deficits, and he therefore assumes a modest attitude: “It would already be an important step to eliminate some incoherence. In any society, there will always be different interests, so that the goal has to be to balance them in a reasonable way. This would already represent substantial progress.” He called the Strategy for Africa an important document to promote dialogue within the EU and initiate a helpful process. The strategy could already have an important impact on programme development for the 10th EDF.

Andrea Goldstein of the OECD Development Center referred to three issues which in his opinion exemplified the need for improvements in coherence in the partnership with Africa:

1. Migration and development. It is an obvious contradiction for development co-operation to attempt to prevent the brain drain away from the developing countries while migration policy sought to attract highly-skilled people from sending countries. This type of selection process sends an incoherent message to the people of Africa.
2. Environmental protection and development. “We all want environmental standards as soon as we get rich,” Goldstein said. Even more could in fact be done. However, high environmental standards may act as a non-tariff trade barrier and restrict market access. Sometimes, it is lobbies with an interest in a segregation of markets that call for stricter environmental standards. Here, scientific expertise is required.
3. Trade and development. The negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are suffering from imbalances. In several cases, developing countries lack the necessary expertise to commit to trade opening. These know-how problems may lead to imbalances in negotiation outcomes. Also, different treatment of topics, such as regulations on origin, leads to unequal results in the different regions.

Security and the role of the AU and the African states
In many African states, sustainable development is either impeded or nullified by violent conflict. In this conference’s working group on foreign and security policy, the complex demands on the EU in this area were highlighted. Adah Simon Ogah of the Nigerian Embassy in Brussels welcomed increased efforts outlined in the Strategy for Africa but then focused attention on the role of the African side. He stressed that his country, Nigeria, had made considerable efforts regarding the Darfur peace process. In Abuja, the peace treaty was signed by the Sudanese Government and the “Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army” – a step raising hopes for rapid improvements in the security situation in Sudan and enabling unhindered distribution of humanitarian aid. Like in the case of Sudan, the AU is also actively involved in conflict management and conflict resolution in the Congo, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Uganda and Chad. Moreover, significant progress had also been made by the AU in developing a peace and security structure for Africa. So seeking new forms of reaching a consensus or new ways to resolve conflicts was not really of such crucial importance. The AU and the sub-regional organisations were in a position to resolve many violent conflicts on their own. But where challenges reached beyond this dimension, they needed the support of partners while being ensured the principle of ownership.

So Ogah welcomed the EU’s decision to continue to fund the African Peace Facility with 300 million euros (2008–2010). However, financing should not come from the monies of the European Development Fund. Ogah maintained that instead, a budget line ought to be introduced in the EU budget.

The EU’s mission in the Congo was also discussed in this context. Representing the Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organisations (VENRO), Bernd Pastors said that there were many reasons for this mission. “Our partners in the Congo seek free elections and democratisation. One is also confronted with this demand and the responsibilities it entails in Germany. If nothing is done, the repercussions will reach Germany as well.” Nevertheless, a difficult decision remained in the context of which a residual risk could not be ruled out. Generally, the military mission could only be regarded as an initial step that had to be followed up by a civil concept.

Hofmann suggested that experience currently being gathered in Darfur and in the Congo ought to be made use of. Collaboration between development co-operation and security policy had to be implemented in practice, for it was impossible to make plans on the drawing-board. In concrete terms, Hofmann stressed that being obliged to embark on sensible co-operation had initiated a process without which it would have been difficult to get the Congo mission off the ground. Now, national solo efforts in Africa could be overcome. In several areas, there was little understanding for the German debate on forms of co-operation.

In the field of peaceful conflict resolution, the EU could boast a veritable success story. European integration brought about insights into how processes could be initiated in order to arrive at a peaceful balance of interests. The European model of learning could serve as a big seller and a model for other world regions. This was why boosting the regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa was a priority for the EU. At the same time, however, Hofmann warned not to simply transfer the European model without observing the different framework conditions.

At the request of the audience, the role of the United Nations (UN) was discussed in this context. Pastors regarded the UN as the overarching umbrella under which important co-ordinating with other states such as China and the USA had to take place.

Hofmann stressed that the Strategy for Africa contained numerous references to the UN, such as the new Peacebuilding Commission. This reflected the EU’s considerable interest in intensive co-operation. Additionally, a stronger European role would take some of the strain off the world system as a whole.

Trade and China’s role

Adah Simon Ogah took up the results of the working group on trade. Like Jean-Luc Maurer, he emphasised the link between trade and development which prohibited treating them separately or in temporal sequence.

Although the EPA negotiations are to be completed by 2007, Ogah still saw a lack of consensus as to the scope, modalities and achievability of its ambitious goals. Supported by non-governmental organisations, many ACP countries demand greater focusing of the EPAs on development, as envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. Ogah feared serious negative consequences for the development of Nigeria and the entire West African Region once the EPAs entered into force. So the identification of potential negative effects and the necessary counter-measures ought to be integrated at an early stage. In principle, Africa was interested in trade with the EU. But one problem was that West Africa’s negotiating mandate was too weak. African negotiating power as a whole had to be strengthened in order to prevent imbalances.

In this context, Andrea Goldstein presented some of the results of this year’s OECD African Economic Outlook. One key result is that Africa is by no means such a poor performer and that overall, and in several individual countries, significant growth can be observed. The reason for this is the boom in the world economy (a fact that is sometimes difficult to comprehend in Europe where economic prospects are more chequered). In spite of this, several Sub-Saharan states were not going to attain the MDGs. Goldstein put this down above all to violent conflict and a poor investment climate among several states. But current economic growth was also resulting in new problems. “How are we going to spend the money? How can revenue from resources be reinvested? Where do we set priorities? Especially with a view to these questions, Europe’s experience can be made use of to avoid bad investment and create credibility.” Here, the Strategy for Africa offered opportunities to improve the links between economic policies and development co-operation.

It was also necessary to secure the stability of current economic growth. Here too, European experience could help Africa to counter the threat of inflation. To this end, it was above all African institutions such as the central banks and the ministries of finance that needed strengthening.

The economic boom in China had had a massive impact on the development of Africa’s economy. In most sectors, China and India had industries complementary to Africa, which had a positive impact on the terms of trade. In contrast, China and Africa were rivals on the world market in the textiles industry. Preferences had to be considered in Europe.

China’s role and the prospects for South-South trade in general were commented in a clearly more positive, albeit ironic manner by Michael Hofmann: “Showing the Chinese how to drink coffee and eat a chicken with it – that’s the sort of music that development holds in store for Africa in the longer term. Instead of moaning about the role of the Chinese and Indians, one has to welcome new trade prospects for the Africans.” The Strategy for Africa was an offer to Africa to stay in business in a positive way. But South-South trade could also result in trade displacement and therefore required sensitivity. Thus the coffee-drinking Chinese could oust the Chinese growing tea. Neither could Europe shirk its responsibilities regarding China’s role. “In spite of all the admiration the Chinese deserve for their dynamics, it will above all be in Europe that the impact of Africa’s encountering the most severe problems is going to be felt. There is a very vital interest among Europeans in Africa’s development. Getting this across to the public is a joint task of the government and civil society. So I very much welcome this event.”

Development and the role of civil societies in the North and the South

While the Cotonou Agreement still assigns civil society an important role, Bernd Pastors believes that it has not been given due consideration in the Strategy for Africa. While it ought to be welcomed that the Strategy made Africa a focal point, “we miss the role of civil society as a co-designer of partnership and see the danger of its increasingly being downgraded into the role of a grateful implementing assistant.” This could result in lower budgets for the implementation of civil society projects as well as less influence than in the past. Also, it remained to be seen whether the strategy would lead to more transparency in the EU’s policy on Africa. “We would stress that we need civil society, for there are a large number of examples in which civil society has played a crucial role.” In this context, Pastors referred to two examples from the activities of action medeor:

Civil society’s participation had been institutionalised in applying for monies from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS/HIV, Malaria and Tuberculosis, which also boosted the role of civil society in Africa.

Without the involvement of civil society groups, access to affordable AIDS medicaments in South Africa would not have been possible. The state and the market had failed completely. Only through the influence of civil society had a change of course been brought about in pharmaceutical industry.

Any economic growth, including that in Africa at the moment, had its weaknesses, especially with regard to environmental protection and human rights. So civil society was needed more than ever. Therefore, the retrograde step that the EU had taken in its Strategy for Africa was not only incomprehensible but also represented a threat to Africa’s development.

Michael Hofmann also counted promoting civil society among the central aspects of partnership. Supporting positive democratisation processes and parliamentarisation belonged to this context. The aim had to be to strengthen parliaments and promote civil society as lobbies. In this manner, a pluralistic society with a reasonable balance of interests could evolve.

At the same time, Michael Hofmann warned of the dangers that exaggerated aid business could pose: “The attitude that ‘We have to stay in business because we’ve got so much to offer’ is untenable in this form. Here, the development co-operation actors have to come down off their high horses.”

While the form of aid business could indeed be observed, Bernd Pastors also referred to significant improvements. NGOs had developed an increased economic understanding of issues. Also, they were pursuing different approaches in various regions. In East Africa, drugs were being produced for the local market. Employment and development were being promoted by establishing local production and creating income.

Germany’s role in the EU Council Presidency

Michael Hofmann outlined the next steps in implementing the strategy: “The Strategy for Africa now has to be filled with life. This means that each EU Council Presidency is going to seek to take up individual bits from it and make a little more progress. That is the European principle. You can rely on us also having planned a number of things for our EU Council Presidency next year.” It was of outstanding importance to promote Africa in a manner that would take into account how Africans had agreed at regional and sub-regional level to promote the development of their continent. Now, the AU presidencies also had to contribute to putting the Strategy into concrete terms. This was why the offer the Strategy was making was of such crucial importance to arriving at an agreement. Here, he referred to the Troika AU talks and the Africa Partnership Forum.

Hofmann specified two areas that the Federal Government seeks to promote during its Council Presidency as priorities in implementing the Strategy for Africa:

In the Governance Initiative, it wishes to further develop options to extend the Troika-AU form of dialogue and further promote dialogue with the sub-regional organisations. Governance is already referred to as a general area of support in the 10th EDF. The African partners were also seeking to support institutions. The German side had gathered much experience with economic reform and decentralisation.

The Infrastructure Initiative is to be given special attention with a particular focus on water.

But it was important to concentrate not only on the hobby issues. The division of labour process had to make progress as well. “It is important to clarify who has comparative strengths in which fields in order to avoid 15 Europeans hopping about in Tanzania all of whom are working in the health service. We have to abandon the notion of an Olympics. This also applies to the larger EU partners.”

Hofmann views the forthcoming EU Council Presidency in close relation to Germany’s G8 Presidency as well, in which emerging economies and anchor countries are also integrated. What will China’s adopting an energy mix mean for Africa? Is Africa going to benefit from the oil prices or is the debt cancellation initiative going to be ruined by higher oil prices? So the issue of energy security in the G8 Presidency is important for Africa.

By Marc Baxmann, VENRO